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THE 1963 PERMISSIVE JOINDER STATUTE IN OHIO
Prior to the abrogation of the distinction between actions at
common law and suits in equity, there was no permissive joinder
of plaintiffs at common law, although there was permissive joinder
of a limited nature of plaintiffs in equity.' There was limited
permissive joinder of defendants both at common law and in
equity.2  In 1853, the Ohio Legislature enacted the Code of Civil
Procedure 3 which was designed to "assist the parties in obtaining
justice." ' Section 34 of the Code (now Ohio Revised Code section
2307.18) provided for permissive joinder of plaintiffs, while section
35 (now Ohio Revised Code section 2307.19) provided for permis-
sive joinder of defendants. Whether the Code as a whole achieved
its objective is debatable,5 but the fact that sections 34 and 35 of
the Code were ineffective is not.
The courts of some states, including Ohio, have simply refused
to give effect to these two sections. Blume, commenting on section
98 of the New York Code (1848), as amended,' which corresponds
to section 35 of the Ohio Code, states that the problem arose
because, "These provisions were intended to fix the maximum
scope of an action in respect to joinder of defendants, but were
so vague that the courts found it necessary to follow the precedents
of the older systems."'  (Emphasis added.) Unfortunately, the
older system followed was the common law, and even in an equity
case, the courts no longer exercised their former discretionary
power." Rutledge v. Corbiu9 was the first case in which the Ohio
Supreme Court construed either section 34 or section 35 of the
Code. The court held that subsequent attaching creditors had an
interest in prior attached property of defendants and could be
joined as plaintiffs in an attachment proceeding with the original
1 Clark, Code Pleading § 56 (2d ed. 1947).
2 Id. § 59.
3 51 Ohio Laws 57 (1853).
4 51 Ohio Laws 57, § 2 (1853).
5 Compare Field Centenary Essays (Reppy ed. 1949) with Carter, The Proposed
Codification of Our Common Law (1884).
6 N.Y. Code (1848), § 98, as amended by N.Y. Laws (1849), c. 438, § 118.
7 Blume, "The Scope of a Civil Action," 42 Mich. L. Rev. 257, 264 (1943).
8 Id. at 263.
9 10 Ohio St. 478 (1860).
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attaching party." Whether the court viewed the subsequent at-
taching creditors as parties united in interest with the original
attaching party, thus requiring joinder, is not clear. However, in
Allen v. Miller"' it is clear that the court viewed sections 34, 35,
and 36 12 of the Code as in pari materia, with section 36 control-
ling,13 i.e., the court would permit joinder only when the parties to
the action were united in interest and therefore had to be joined.
Further evidence that this was the court's view of joinder is the
case of Clark v. Fry '1 which held that a master and his servant may
not be joined as parties defendant when the master's liability is
predicated solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. Although
the Clark case was decided five years after the enactment of the
Code, the court did not mention the joinder statutes, but relied
instead upon the Massachusetts case of Parsons v. Winchell.'5 In
Losito v. Kruse,"0 the Ohio Supreme Court referred to the master
who was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior as being
"secondarily" liable, while the servant was "primarily" liable to
the injured party. In Schimke v. Earley 7 Judge Taft in a con-
curring opinion seemed to indicate that this was still the rule as to
joinder of master and servant in Ohio.'
The major consequence of the Ohio courts' refusal to give
substance to the joinder statutes was to prevent joinder of master
and servant where the doctrine of respondeat superior was appli-
cable. However, the Ohio courts have not permitted the joinder of
plaintiffs when defendant intentionally or negligently injures more
than one person by the same intentional or negligent act" nor
have they permitted such joinder of plaintiffs when defendant
injures more than one person by several tortious acts of a similar
10 Id. at 486.
11 11 Ohio St. 374 (1860).
12 Section 36 (now Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 230720) provided:
Of the parties to the action, those who are united in interest must be joined,
as plaintiffs or defendants; but if the consent of one who should have been
joined as plaintiff, cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant, the
reason being stated in the petition.
13 Allen v. Miller, supra note 11, at 377.
14 8 Ohio St. 358 (1858). An excellent article on the subsequent case law of
joinder of master and servant in Ohio is Wills, "Joinder of Master and Servant," 23
Ohio St. L.J. 488 (1962).
15 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 592 (1850). Contra, Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 51
Wyo. 1, 62 P.2d 1297 (1936). The Wyoming court in construing an identical statute
held that the statute permitted joinder of master and servant.
16 136 Ohio St 183, 24 N.E2d 705 (1940).
17 173 Ohio St. 521, 184 N.E.2d 209 (1962).
18 Id. at 523, 184 N.E.2d at 211 (Taft, J., concurring) (by implication).
'9 Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., 132 Ohio St. 125, 5 N.E.2d 324 (1936) (dictum).
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nature.20 Joinder of plaintiffs was further restricted in some cases
by Ohio Revised Code section 2309.06 21 requiring united causes of
action to affect all the parties to the action.22 As for the joinder
of defendants, the Ohio courts have not permitted the joinder of
a city and an abutting landowner when the city and the landowner
are not joint tortfeasors2 the joinder of a manufacturer and a
retailer where there is no joint liability,2 or the joinder of an
independent contractor and the person employing him. 25 Also, the
Ohio courts have refused to permit joinder of defendants in the
alternative.26
The Ohio Supreme Court has greatly liberalized permissive
joinder of concurrent tortfeasors in the last twenty-five years in
the three successive cases of Wery v. Seff,27 Meyer v. Cincinnati
Street Ry.,2s and Schindler v. Standard Oil Co. 29 It appears that
the Ohio Supreme Court may have been ready to overrule Clark
v. Fry 30 since it allowed a motion to certify in Darling v. Home
Gas d Appliances, Inc.31 "for the purpose of reexamining the de-
cisions holding that a plaintiff cannot join a master and his servant
as defendants in an action to recover damages caused by the negli-
gence of the servant." 32
After the motion to certify the Darling case was granted, the
Ohio Legislature enacted Ohio Revised Code section 2307.191,
33
providing for the permissive joinder of persons in one action, and
the Ohio Supreme Court thereafter dismissed the appeal because
20 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Lanz, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 121 (Ct. App. 1934).
But see Clark v. McClain Fire Brick Co., 100 Ohio St. 110, 125 N.E. 908 (1919).
21 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2309.06 provides inter alia, "The causes of action
united as provided in section 2309.05 of the Revised Code . . . must affect all the
arties to the action... .
22 Taylor v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 287, 110 N.E. 739 (1915).
23 Larson v. Cleveland Ry., 142 Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E.2d 163 (1943).
24 Canton Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935).
25 Albers v. Great Central Transport Co., 145 Ohio St. 129, 60 N.E.2d 669
(1945).
26 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 18 Ohio C.C.R. 879, 6 Ohio C.C. Dec. 165
(1897).
27 136 Ohio St. 307, 25 N.E.2d 692 (1940), noted in 7 Ohio St. L.J. 278 (1941).
2S 157 Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E2d 173 (1952), noted in 13 Ohio St. L.J. 538 (1952).
20 166 Ohio St. 391, 143 N.E2d 133 (1957).
30 Supra note 14.
31 175 Ohio St. 250, 193 N.E.2d 391 (1963).
32 Ibid.
33 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.191 (Page Supp. 1963), effective August 29, 1963,
provides:
(A). All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising
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of the enactment of the statute. However, the Darling case is sig-
nificant for the Ohio Supreme Court expressly held therein that this
statute permits joinder of master and servant as parties defend-
ant.34 Although the question whether or not a master and his
servant inay be joined in a single action to recover damages
for the negligence of the servant has been answered, there are
many other questions under the statute which the Ohio Supreme
Court will have to answer and many problems which Ohio prac-
titioners will have to recognize. The purpose of the remainder of
this comment is to discuss some of these questions and problems.
JOINDER OF PARTIES PLAINTIFF
Under the Ohio permissive joinder statute, persons who have
been injured by the same intentional or negligent act of a defend-
ant should now be permitted to join as parties plaintiff.35 Persons
should also be permitted to join as parties plaintiff when the defend-
ant has injured them by several related tortious acts of a similar
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise
in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right
to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact com-
mon to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not
be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judg-
ment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their
respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to
their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants accord-
ing to their respective liabilities.
(B). The court may make such orders as will prevent a party from being
embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party against
whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him, and may
order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
This section is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 except for the phrase in italics.
The additional phrase was probably added to indicate that the judgment could
dispose of a counterclaim. However, it is submitted that a clearer phraseology would
have been "and for one or more defendants according to their respective rights to
relief." Some other jurisdictions which have similar permissive joinder statutes are
California, Illinois, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Washington.
34 Supra note 31, at 251, 193 N.E.2d at 391.
35 This has been the holding both under the Federal Rules and in states which
have similar permissive joinder statutes. Sporia v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
143 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Emery v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 8 Cal. 2d 663,
67 P.2d 1046 (1937); Seeds v. Chicago Transit Authority, 409 Ill. 566, 101 N.E2d
84 (1951). Compare text preceding note 19, supra.
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nature." Furthermore, the limitations on joinder of parties plain-
tiff imposed by Ohio Revised Code section 2309.06 37 should be
alleviated by the Ohio permissive joinder statute. The California
Court of Appeal in Peters v. Bigelow 38 held that section 427 of
the California Civil Procedure Code" did not restrict section 378
of the Code 40 because to hold otherwise would give no effect to the
latter statute.41  The California court also noted that the intention
of the legislature in enacting a permissive joinder statute was
to simplify the conduct of actions, 42 and for the court to hold that
the permissive joinder statute was limited by section 427 of the Code
would be to defeat the intent of the legislature.
The major problem for counsel with the joinder of parties
plaintiff is not whether there can be joinder, but whether there
should be joinder in a particular case from a tactical standpoint.
As a matter of trial tactics, counsel may not want to join as parties
plaintiff persons other than husband and wife or parent and child,
which joinder was partially authorized by the 1957 amendment to
Ohio Revised Code section 2309.05. 43  In deciding whether or not
to join two or more persons as parties plaintiff, there are at least
two factors which counsel must take into consideration. The first
is whether the plaintiffs will cooperate with each other. Total
strangers will be primarily interested in the outcome of their own
individual causes of action. The course one plaintiff may want to
36 See Akley v. Kinnicutt, 238 N.Y. 466, 144 N.E. 682 (1924); Adams v.
Albany, 124 Cal. App. 2d 639, 269 P.2d 142 (1954). Compare text preceding note
20, supra. Other instances where plaintiffs have been joined are: Peoples' Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n. v. State Franchise Tax Bd., 110 Cal. App. 2d 696, 243 P.2d 902 (1952),
where taxpayers were held to be properly joined as parties plaintiff in a suit for a
tax refund, notwithstanding the fact that they would be entitled to refunds of differ-
ent amount; Abschagen v. Goldfarb, 8 App. Div. 2d 750, 185 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1959),
where a life tenant of real property and his remainderman joined as parties plaintiff
in an action against an adjoining landowner who had done damage to the realty; and
Bush v. Murray, 209 App. Div. 563, 205 N.Y. Supp. 21 (1924), where plaintiffs
joined in an action against their attorney and others for defrauding them and obtain-
ing possession of their property when the claim arose out of the same contract.
37 Supra note 21. However, the Ohio Supreme Court failed to recognize the
effect of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2307.91 in deciding Huggins v. Morrell & Co., 176
Ohio St. 171 (1964).
as 137 Cal. App. 135, 30 P.2d 450 (1934).
39 This section is comparable to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2309.06 (Page Supp.
1963).
40 This section is comparable to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.191, supra note 33.
41 Supra note 38, at 141, 30 P.2d at 452.
42 Supra note 38, at 141-42, 30 P.2d at 453. Accord, Weigend v. Hulsh, 315
Ill. App. 116, 42 N.E.2d 146 (1942) ; Chiba v. Kurutz, 263 App. Div. 33, 31 N.Y.S2d
171 (1941).
43 Effective November 9, 1957.
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pursue could be contrary to the best interests of another plaintiff.
The second factor to be taken into consideration is the nature of
the cause of action. If the action is one for personal injury to two
or more persons, each person is likely to recover more when each
claim is tried separately.44 However, if the action is one for deceit
or fraudulent misrepresentation, it would probably be advantageous
to each plaintiff for a number of similar instances to be presented
simultaneously. 45 Counsel must analyze each case to determine
whether or not it would be advantageous to join two or more
persons as parties plaintiff under the permissive joinder statute.
If a person joins as a co-plaintiff, he should, as in any other
case, assert his entire cause of action.46 If he asserts only part of his
cause of action, a judgment on the merits may have the effect of
extinguishing his entire cause of action. A co-plaintiff is more
likely than a sole plaintiff to make the procedural error of "splitting
a cause of action."
If an action by one plaintiff would have been removable to
federal court, an action by two or more plaintiffs may possibly
be removable because of the presence of a "separate and independ-
ent cause of action" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1441(c),
even though the presence of the other plaintiffs prevents removal
under paragraph (a) or (b) of that section.4 7  Thus joinder of
plaintiffs will not necessarily be effective to prevent removal to
federal court.
JOINDER OF PARTIES DEFENDANT
By reason of the holding of the Ohio Supreme Court in the
Darling case,4 8 a plaintiff should be able to join as parties defend-
ant all persons who are primarily and secondarily liable to him for
an injury to his person or property. This would include the joinder
of a city and abutting property owner, the joinder of a manufac-
turer and a retailer, and the joinder of an independent contractor
and the person employing him. This changes the former Ohio
rule.49 As a result of this change in the Ohio joinder rule, a plain-
44 Louisell & Hazard, Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal 675 (1962).
45 Ibid.
46 For example, plaintiff must assert a personal injury claim and a property
damage claim caused by the same tortious act of defendant in one cause of action
under the present Ohio rule. Rush v. Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E2d
599 (1958), noted in 19 Ohio St. L.J. 477 (1958).
47 Moore, Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code 238-39 (1949) ; Moore & Van-
Dercreek, "Multi-Party, Multi-Claim Removal Problems: The Separate and Inde-
pendent Claim Under Section 1441(c)," 46 Iowa L. Rev. 489, 505 (1961).
48 Supra note 31.
49 Compare text following note 22, supra. Other instances where defendants
have been joined are: Delia Plastering Co. v. D. H. Dave, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 304 (N.D.
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tiff may now prevent removal to federal court in some instances by
joining as a defendant the servant of another defendant. The
cause of action against the non-resident master does not constitute
a "Cseparate and independent cause of action" even though the
master could have removed had he been the sole defendant.50 A
plaintiff can properly join concurrent or joint tortfeasors either
under Ohio Revised Code section 2307.19 51 or under the new per-
missive joinder statute. In addition, a similar permissive joinder
statute has been construed to permit a plaintiff to join the rep-
resentatives of a deceased joint tortfeasor with the surviving joint
tortfeasors. 2 Whether the Ohio courts should permit joinder of
independent tortfeasors when the injuries inflicted are divisible
and distinct will be discussed infra.
The new permissive joinder statute expressly permits the
joinder of parties in the alternative, which was not permitted by
previous Ohio decisions." For example, a plaintiff should now be
able to join two persons as parties defendant by stating his claim
against the defendants in the alternative when he does not know
which of two defendants were driving a motor vehicle at the time
of an accident,"4 or when he does not know whether a purported
agent had the authority to make a contract on behalf of his pur-
ported principal."' In a proper instance, a plaintiff can assert his
Ohio 1951), where the court held that a surety company, which according to the
terms of its bond was jointly and severally liable with the subcontractor on the
contract, was a proper party defendant in an action for breach of the subcontract
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a); and Schoner v. Koeppel, 237 App. Div. 860, 261 N.Y.
Supp. 458 (1932), where a third person who, with a partner, had wrongfully deprived
the partnership of some of its assets was properly joined as a defendant in a part-
nership accounting.
50 Moore, supra note 47, at 238; Moore & Vandercreek, supra note 47, at 502-05.
It was formerly held that if plaintiff joined master and servant in an Ohio state court
in violation of the Ohio rule, such joinder was "constructively fraudulent" and did
not prevent removal by the non-resident master. Baier v. General Motors (Delco
Div.), Civil No. 2110, S.D.W.D. Ohio, April 26, 1957. Undoubtedly the change in
the Ohio joinder rule destroys the basis of the Baier holding. The effect of a
voluntary dismissal of the resident servant in this situation will be discussed infra.
51 Wery v. Seff, supra note 27.
52 Fischer v. Lippmann, 240 App. Div. 770, 266 N.Y. Supp. 14 (1933). This
was probably permissible even under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.19.
53 Supra note 26.
54 Fowler v. Baker, 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 8e.63, Case 1 (M.D.Pa. June 20, 1940).
See West's Fed. R. Civ. P. 139-40, Form 10 (1959).
55 Amalgamated Packaging Industries, Ltd. v. National Container Corp. (Del.),
14 F.R.D. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Stein, Hall & Co. v. A. M. Alison & Co., 123
Misc. 382, 205 N.Y. Supp. 422 (App. T. 1924).
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claim against three defendants in the alternative.56 In such actions,
not only will the plaintiff save time and money, but he will be
protected against the risk of inconsistent findings of fact in two or
more separate trials, each of which is adverse to the plaintiff.57
At the same time, the burden upon the court dockets may be
appreciably reduced.
SPEcIAL PROBLEMS
This comment will discuss four problems which probably will
arise in the use of the new permissive joinder statute. The first
is an election problem. Although as a result of the 1936 statute
a plaintiff will no longer be required to elect between a master
and his servant who have been joined as defendants,58 a plaintiff
may decide to do so voluntarily in some cases. Thus when
plaintiff has established to his satisfaction the existence of agency
in an action against a master and his servant for injuries caused
by the negligent conduct of the servant, plaintiff may prefer to
dismiss voluntarily as to the defendant servant. If plaintiff does
not voluntarily elect, but goes to the jury against both defendants,
there is the danger that the jury may improperly return a verdict
against the master but in favor of the servant, especially in a case
where a corporation is the master. In considering whether to dis-
miss as against the defendant servant, plaintiff must realize that
he will not be able to maintain a new action against the dismissed
servant if the statute of limitations has run, because the saving
statute " does not apply to voluntary dismissals. 0  Furthermore,
if a judgment is rendered in favor of the master by reason of a
determination that the servant was not negligent, such a judgment
would preclude recovery against the servant."1 In some situations,
a voluntary dismissal of the servant may make the case removable
56 George v. Long Transp. Co., 11 F.R.D. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1951). See Metrakos
v. New York Cent. R.R., 12 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1951), where the court held that
plaintiff can assert his claim in the alternative against all persons against whom he
asserts a right to relief; and Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Beaunit Mills, Inc., 4 App. Div.
2d 519, 167 N.Y.S.2d 387 (1957), where the court held that a purchaser of textile
goods was entitled to join the seller and the processor of the goods in a single
action to determine whether the goods were defective, and if so, whether the defect
was a consequence of the breach of the seller or the processor, or both of them.
57 Louisell & Hazard, op. cit. supra note 44, at 675.
58 Sypherd v. Haeckl's Express, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 255 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
59 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.19.
60 Siegfried v. Railroad Co., 50 Ohio St. 294, 34 N.E. 331 (1893). This case
was limited somewhat by Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mutl. Ins. Co.,
171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E2d 774 (1960), but the rule in Siegf red would still be
applicable to the situation described in the text.
61 Schimke v. Earley, supra note 17.
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to federal court. Thus, if the master is a non-resident of Ohio and
the servant is a resident,6 2 voluntary dismissal of the resident de-
fendant would arguably make the case removable to federal court
if all the jurisdictional requirements are met, because this would be
the first opportunity the non-resident defendant has to remove to
federal court. 3 Another factor which may militate against a
voluntary election is the possibility of excess liability insurance
coverage which may be available to the plaintiff only if a judgment
is recovered against the servant.
The second problem which the Ohio courts should consider
is the abrogation of the highly technical and patently unsound rule
in Bucurenciu v. Ramba.4 This rule was laid down at a time when
the distinction between the procedural problem of joinder of de-
fendants and the substantive problem of entire liability 65 was not
recognized. The new permissive joinder statute clearly permits
joinder of defendants even if entire liability is uncertain or unlikely.
Therefore, the basic policy of the new statute will be frustrated
unless the Bucurenciu line of cases is overruled. The Bucurenciu
rule is not necessary to prevent joinder of defendants in bad faith.
If a plaintiff deliberately joins a resident defendant against whom
no substantial possibility of recovery exists, for the sole purpose
of manufacturing venue, the court undoubtedly has the power to
set aside the summons which has been issued to a foreign county.
62 If plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio, defendant master is a citizen of a state other
than Ohio, and defendant servant is a citizen of Ohio, the case can not be removed
to federal court with master and servant joined as parties defendant because there
is not complete diversity of citizenship. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806). Even if there is complete diversity of citizenship in the state court
action, the joinder of the resident defendant servant would prevent removal to the
federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1948).
63 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. IL
1949), provides inter alia:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for
removal may be filed within twenty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order
or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one
which is or has become removable.
64 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927), where the court held that a non-
resident defendant who was joined as a concurrent tortfeasor with a resident defend-
ant raised the question of jurisdiction over his person by entering a general denial,
and that if the jury found in favor of the resident defendant, but against the non-
resident defendant, the non-resident defendant was to be dismissed. Accord, Glass
v. McCullough Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505, 115 N.E2d 78 (1957).
65 Entire liability is the common law doctrine that a defendant "might be liable
for the entire damages sustained by a plaintiff, even though his act concurred or
combined and that of another wrongdoer to produce the result. . . ." Prosser,
Torts 240 (2d ed. 1955).
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The third problem is the joinder in a single action of independ-
ent contributing tortfeasors whose separate acts inflict injuries
which are divisible and distinct. The present rule in Ohio is that a
plaintiff is not permitted to join independent contributing tort-
feasors in the same action.66 However, when a question of law or
fact common to all defendants arises (which might be the case in
an action for damages caused by separately maintained nuisances)
the Ohio permissive joinder statute provides that a plaintiff may
join the parties as defendants in a single action. 7 This will require
the Ohio courts to permit juries to return verdicts in different
amounts against each defendant according to his respective liability.
This is consistent with federal decisions on this question under
the federal permissive joinder rule. 8 Under the former Ohio
joinder rule, if a plaintiff was uncertain whether the evidence would
establish a single indivisible injury, or divisible and distinct in-
juries, he might well hesitate to join defendants in a single
action, as a joint verdict in a single amount could not prop-
erly be returned in the second case. Under the new statute, plaintiff
may safely join the defendants, and the court should, in a proper
case, submit alternative forms of verdict to the jury, along with
appropriate instructions. Thus, in a case in which the evidence
would permit the jury to find that either type of liability is estab-
lished, a court might properly submit (1) a verdict in favor of
plaintiff against defendant A, (2) a verdict against plaintiff in
favor of defendant A, (3) a verdict in favor of plaintiff against
defendant B, (4) a verdict against plaintiff in favor of defendant
B, (5) a verdict in favor of plaintiff against defendants A and B,
and (6) a verdict against plaintiff in favor of defendants A and B.
If in a particular case it appears that the instructions and general
verdict forms will be difficult for the jury to follow, counsel might
give consideration to the desirability of making a request for a
special verdict under Ohio Revised Code section 2315.15." In a
complex multiparty case, it might be much easier for a jury to
render a special verdict.
The final problem is the proper form of verdict and judgment
in cases in which one defendant is under a duty to indemnify an-
66 City of Mansfield v. Bristor, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N.E. 631 (1907) (dictum),
where the court stated that when different parties discharge sewerage into a stream
without concerted action, the parties are not joint tortfeasors and therefore can not
be joined. A similar problem is created when A injures plaintiff's leg and then B
injures plaintiff's arm. Prosser, supra note 65, at 230.
67 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.191, supra note 33.
68 Rabbitt v. Hale, 184 F2d 443 (8th Cir. 1950).
69 In Miller v. McAllister, 169 Ohio St. 487, 160 N.E2d 231 (1959), the Ohio
Supreme Court suggested a form of special verdict in negligence cases.
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other defendant. This includes the primary-secondary liability cases
such as those in which a master and his servant, a city and an
abutting property owner, a manufacturer and a retailer, an inde-
pendent contractor and the person employing him have been joined.
As the the permissive joinder statute expressly permits judgments
to be entered "against one or more defendants according to their
respective liabilities," 70 the court (if a request is made by any
party) should require the jury, if it finds both defendants liable, to
render separate verdicts against each defendant in the same amount.
The court should then enter separate judgments against each de-
fendant in the same amount and ordinarily in the same journal
entry.7' The journal entry should make it clear that both judgments
are for the same injury, and that the satisfaction of either judgment
will discharge the other. The journal entry might also contain ex-
press findings that defendants are not concurrent tortfeasors, and
that defendant B is liable solely by reason of the primary-secondary
relationship between the defendants. This procedure in a master-
servant case should preserve the master's right against the servant
for reimbursement in the event that the judgment is enforced
against the master.
SEPARATE TRIALS
Even though a plaintiff has properly joined with another or
has properly joined two or more parties as parties defendant, the
court in its discretion may order separate trials or other relief in
certain instances. 72 The statute thus recognizes that joinder of
parties is a pleading problem, and that a rule which permits parties
to be joined as a matter of pleading should not necessarily require
the claims by or against such parties to be tried together. However,
the burden of proof of undue prejudice is upon the person objecting
to the joinder of parties 73 and therefore should not prove to be a
problem area under the statute.
CONCLUSION
The permissive joinder statute will be a valuable aid in avoid-
ing multiplicity of suits in Ohio, but it should not be used auto-
matically and indiscriminately. Counsel should analyze each case
70 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.191, supra note 33. See also Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2323.02.
71 Wills, "Joinder of Master and Servant," 23 Ohio St. LJ. 488, 499-501 (1962).
72 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.191, supra note 33.
73 See Bossak v. National Surety Co. of New York, 205 App. Div. 707, 200 N.Y.
Supp. 148 (1923), where the court held that striking the name of a defendant who
had been properly joined was an abuse of the trial court's discretion when no undue
prejudice was shown by the defendant
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from a legal and a tactical viewpoint before making a decision
to utilize the statute. Various problems will arise by reason of
the freer joinder of parties under the new statute. This is the
price which must be paid for reducing the number of lawsuits.
However, these problems have been solved satisfactorily in the
many jurisdictions which have modern party joinder provisions,
and there is no reason to believe that they cannot be similarly
solved in Ohio.
Russell C. Shaw
